In what is a regular feature, distinguished contributors consider one of the controversial issues of the day. With all the media hype surrounding new online lending platforms, such as Kiva.org, the time is right to ask if microfinance really is an effective poverty reduction tool.
Anis Chowdhury is Professor of Economics at the University of Western Sydney, Australia. Currently, he is working as a Senior Economic Affairs Officer at the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN-DESA).
***
Professor Mohammad Yunus, the originator of the concept of microfinance, believes that 5% of Grameen Bank’s clients exit poverty each year. However, there are few credible estimates of the extent to which microcredit actually reduces poverty.
Ideally one can ascertain the impact of microfinance if the counterfactual – what would have happened to a person who borrowed from a microlender if he/she had not done so – can be easily tested. Many early studies compared borrowers with non-borrowers. But if borrowers are more entrepreneurial than those who do not borrow, such comparisons are likely to grossly overstate the effect of microcredit. Two recent studies attempted to overcome this problem by using randomized sample selection methods. Neither study found that microcredit reduced poverty. One of these studies found no impact on measures of health, education, or women’s decision-making among the slum dwellers in the city of Hyderabad, India. The other study found that the provision of microfinance in Manila, the Philippines, had no discernible effects on the probability of being below the poverty line nor did it find any significant impact on the quality of food that people ate.
The findings of the most cited set of studies, based on empirical evidence drawn from comparative experiences in seven developing countries (published in 1996), are also provocative: poor households do not benefit from microfinance; it is only non-poor borrowers who can do well with microfinance and enjoy sizable positive impacts. A vast majority of those with starting incomes below the poverty line actually ended up with less incremental income after getting microloans, as compared to a control group which did not get such loans.
No miracle cure
These findings imply that credit is only one factor in the generation of income or output. There are other complementary factors, crucial for making credit more productive. Among them, the most important is the recipient’s entrepreneurial skills. Most poor people do not have the basic education or experience to understand and manage even low level business activities. They are mostly risk-averse, often fearful of losing whatever little they have, and are struggling to survive. Most prominent promoters of microfinance, including Professor Yunus and Sam Daley-Harris, director of the Microcredit Summit Campaign, recognize that microcredit is not a miracle cure; for it to succeed other complementary factors are needed.
Some microfinance institutions (MFIs) and non-governmental organizations seem to have understood this need, and are offering training to build management and entrepreneurial skills. However, the focus has been generally on supply-side factors which complement one another to make microinvestment productive. Very little attention has been paid to the demand side. In the absence of an expanding domestic market, microenterprises will most likely replicate a barter economy. In extreme cases of a stagnant market, the availability of credit in order to facilitate transactions can leave the parties even worse off, as they have to repay loans with interest, while seeing no growth in revenues or income. Therefore, it is not surprising that a World Bank-sponsored study (published in 2005) involving 1,800 households in Bangladesh, found only very marginal improvements for borrowers of microcredit. For example, the incomes of women who received microcredit increased by only 8 taka for each 100 borrowed. As one commentator noted, a US$250 one-year loan would raise a borrower’s annual income by US$12.50, or about three cents a day!
This modest income gain happened in the context of rapidly expanding garments production in Bangladesh. It would have been an interesting counter-factual to see what would have happened in the absence of the fast expanding garments industry. Consideration of demand-side factors highlights the importance of pro-growth macroeconomic, trade, and industry policies.
In response to the modest findings in terms of monetary measures of poverty, advocates of microfinance cite impressive social progress, such as reduced infant and maternal mortality in Bangladesh. But can such achievements be attributed to microfinance? Sri Lanka was a star performer in social progress long before the microfinance movement started. In recent times, Andhra Pradesh in India has also performed much better than the rest of India in terms of social indicators of development. Microfinance does not seem to have played a big role there either.
Interest rates
The interest rates charged by microfinance institutions have drawn vigorous criticism. There are claims of interest rates ranging from 30 to 100% on an annualized basis. Some defend the high rates on grounds of sustainability; anything less will not attract profit-seeking bankers into this market. However, this argument weakens the claim that microfinance is more cost effective compared to commercial banking loans.
Where the interest rate is at the lower end, it is often due to implicit subsidies. This, then, raises the issue of the social opportunity cost of subsidies; could this money be better utilized elsewhere, such as for public health, education, or supporting agriculture and rural industries? Some defend the MFIs’ interest rates by arguing that they are still less onerous than the alternatives offered by moneylenders. Others argue that the returns on capital are indeed high in microenterprises, and that therefore the levying of high interest rates is justifiable. In respect of the latter, it is not clear how these studies impute the cost of ‘own labour’ – the time and labour spent by the owner of the microenterprise. In an economy characterized by surplus labour, one can impute a zero shadow price for own labour. In that case, the entire surplus over and above the cost of capital can be regarded as profit or returns on capital. This could be the most plausible explanation for finding high returns from microenterprise loans.
Ideally, own labour should be priced at a “decent” or legislated minimum wage to enhance poverty reduction. Employment (self or otherwise) at a wage below a decent rate only adds to the pool of “working poor”, who perhaps are even more vulnerable to shocks, due to the debt burden of microcredit. This could be another explanation for the so-called graduation problem of microenterprises, or why so many loans need to be rescheduled or refinanced, as reported by the Wall Street Journal.
Expansion of microfinance
If the poverty reduction impact of microfinance is so doubtful, how can one explain the movement’s phenomenal expansion? The authors of an extensive survey of the literature and interviews with the movement’s leading players claim that the success of microfinance is due to innovative business practices involving product design and management, and enabling environments. Similarly, extensive case studies of MFIs in Bangladesh and the Philippines found that the real explanation for their success lay in careful attention to managerial and strategic ‘fundamentals’. These include keeping transaction costs low, and matching loan payment schedules to borrowers’ income and savings potential.
Microfinance institutions claim that small loans do reduce poverty, and institutional and individual donors respond with huge donations. However, research suggests that, while microfinance can help in times of crisis, in the long-term its monetary impact is minimal
A political economy explanation for the growth of the microfinance movement is that microfinance campaigners successfully projected the image of the movement, such as empowerment of women, which resonates well with the donor community. The birth of the movement roughly coincided with the rise of neo-liberal ideas in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Thus, the notion that microfinance programmes are primarily engaged in the promotion of small-scale enterprises appealed to major donors. While donors were wary of subsidized credit through state-owned specialized financial institutions, they were quite happy to subsidize microfinance institutions, as they appeared to promote a market economy, and more importantly, they helped to diminish the role of the government.
In liquidity-constrained societies, there is always demand for credit. So, when donor-supported MFIs push the supply of credit, there is no shortage of takers. As a result, microfinance expanded exponentially. However, if the market itself does not expand rapidly, this can only create debt burden or underutilization of credit, and a downward pressure on the returns on investment.
Positive contributions
Even the vocal critics admit that microfinance can help the poor smooth consumption over periods of cyclical downturns or unexpected crises. If this consumption smoothing means parents can send their children to school, or buy essential medications, and maintain nutritional intakes of their children, then microfinance is likely to have positive long-term impacts on productivity.
The high interest rates that are charged remain an important concern, and most MFIs have been found lacking in lending to the ultra poor. Nonetheless, it seems that microfinance has significantly dented the informal credit markets by undermining debt-bondage and usury in some agrarian societies. Thus, microfinance is having a modernizing impact.
More importantly, by “democratizing” the credit market, the microfinance movement has also constrained the MFIs’ own behaviour. For example, when some MFI officials went to collect repayments immediately following the devastating cyclone Sidr in Bangladesh in 2007, this was widely reported in the national newspapers. As a result, the MFIs acted quickly to suspend loan recovery and to offer softer loan conditions.
In other words, the rapid expansion of microfinance has empowered not just women, but all small borrowers. Note should also be taken of the learning-by-doing effect. Even when own labour in microenterprises is given a zero shadow price, the people who are involved do benefit. They learn some basic principles of business, and with luck, and perhaps some help, may be able to become more viable and even expand. This is akin to apprenticeship where the apprentice gets a low wage, but in exchange gets training in a trade. So, with their support and training programmes, many MFIs are making some useful contributions. Microfinance gives the unemployed and the poor some opportunities, hope, and self-esteem.
Finally, being successful business ventures, microfinance institutions themselves have also created a large number of well-paid jobs, which should have considerable multiplier effects.
Many of these positive effects cannot be measured in monetary terms, and hence will remain largely unacknowledged in the literature focused on the traditional income or expenditure measures of poverty.
Conclusion
The danger of the hype about microfinance – and the focus on microenterprises – is that the needs of small businesses in the informal sector may not get due attention. The owner-operators of these small businesses have already proven their entrepreneurial acumen, but they face numerous constraints, ranging from inability to access the formal credit market, to difficulties with marketing their products. These enterprises should be supported with easy access to credit and other financial services, such as insurance. Their problems have been exacerbated by neo-liberal financial sector reforms which have sought to promote profit-seeking financial institutions by eliminating state-run, specialized financial institutions that catered for the needs of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and the agricultural sector. It is now realized that these reforms had their own limitations, and that SMEs and the agricultural sector, especially food production, need state support. Management and operational lessons learnt from successful MFIs can provide valuable inputs into the design of specialized financial institutions for SMEs and the agricultural sector.
The above is an edited and abridged version of UN-DESA working paper #89
Join us on Facebook
Follow us on Twitter
Subscribe to Magazine
This article is to be commended for highlighting a number of the most pressing issues concerning microfinance today, especially since it is produced by a staff member of one of the international development agencies (UN-DESA) with a major interest in local economic development. With honourable exceptions, the main international development agencies seek to hugely underplay the very significant damage inflicted upon developing and transition economies thanks to microfinance, preferring instead to follow the lead set by the World Bank (especially the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, CGAP), the IMF and USAID. However, a number of important omissions that generally lead to an over-statement of the importance and impact of microfinance. Permit me to comment at some length.
First, the counterfactual issue. The true counterfactual to microfinance is actually what a similar intervention or program, using the same resources and targeted at the same people, would have achieved in the local community. For example, if we cared to look, we might find that Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) or SME programs help the poor in a local community much better over the longer term compared to microfinance programs that increasingly do no more ‘good’ than simply putting the poor into more microdebt than ever. ‘The poor always pay back’ as the authors of a Muhammad Yunus hagiography famously said. But what they felt quite unable to say was that the poor increasingly repay their microloans by simply taking out more and more microloans to repay the earlier ones! This is why southern India and also Bangladesh too, are becoming dangerously over-supplied with microfinance, and it is why the Grameen Bank itself is, by all accounts, getting into some serious problems.
Second, we really do have to accept that almost all microfinance impact evaluations to date are seriously flawed, and probably deliberately so, in order to egregiously inflate the impact arising from microfinance. The conventional impact evaluations do this by deliberately ignoring two hugely important downside factors. The first one is ‘job displacement’, which is when a new or expanded microenterprise simply takes business from another microenterprise, which closes or sheds its own staff. This effect generally means little NET additional economic activity in most poor regions is registered thanks to establishing or expanding microenterprises in the very simplest of business areas (trade, petty services, etc). Anyone who, like me, gets annoyed whenever they hear Wal-Mart claiming to have created 400 jobs in a locality when it opens up a new retail store, knowing also that what they very conveniently leave out is the fact that many of the local retailers close down and/or shed jobs as a result of Wal-Mart’s entry, will understand what I’m getting at here. Simply replacing one street vendor or mobile phone time seller or fast food stand with another one operating in the same street or neighbourhood, is a process that creates few jobs or additional income. Moreover, microfinance-induced entry and expansion helps to depress the price of these local non-tradable goods and services. This is not so good if you are one of the non-clients of the microfinance institution. Job displacement, it should be quickly pointed out, also has little economic merit from a Schumpeterian-style ‘transformational’ angle. There is generally little ‘transformational’ about simple job churn involving very simple microenterprises.
The other key issue of concern here is client failure, which is when a microfinance client fails, which statistics tell us most do after a few years. This is especially the case if they are of the ‘poverty push’ variety, which is what we are talking about when we talk about microfinance, and not the ‘opportunity-pull’ variety, which is the type of entrepreneurship that is more productive. The main impact here is that those desperately seeking an exit from poverty through a simple microenterprise project very often end up in even deeper and irretrievable poverty later on if – or we should say, when – it all goes wrong. To repay their microloan after the business venture fails the poor typically have to sell off personal assets (including land), savings have to be drawn down, relatives are tapped for their support, and other income flows (notably remittances) are diverted into microloan repayment. The poor thus very often end up much worse off than before they accessed their microloans.
Importantly, the faddish ‘randomised control trials’ (RCT) methodology largely fails to factor in these two huge problems, with the result that they always produce a more positive evaluation of microfinance than is merited by the situation on the ground.
The section in the article on interest rates is also interesting, but I think it really needed to reflect upon two other important things as well. First, yes, providing a microloan is an expensive business, requiring lots of paperwork, officers on the ground and other things to do with running a program with so many clients. But raising interest rates to cover the full cost of this is not the answer because this directly hurts the poor. As elsewhere, this ‘full cost recovery’ mantra has been thoroughly discredited because it has brought down huge damage upon the poor denied access to health services and education. It needs to be completely demolished here too. But one problem that should have been raised is that, just like any other business (just ask the commercial banks seeking to recover from their antics up to 2008), the poor need low interest rates in order to have a reasonable chance of being successful. With high interest rates you simply cannot realise a little surplus, which you would otherwise hope to reinvest in your microenterprise, or else use to provide a few better things for your family. Yet commercialised microfinance makes a point of demanding that the poor pay the FULL cost of their microloan through high (market-based) interest rates, since profits are needed to provide more microfinance (outreach) to others equally poor. But a very strange moral imperative is at work here: it is essentially asking one very poor stratum of society today to cover the cost of helping out another equally poor stratum tomorrow, or somewhere else. To my mind, such a novel form of horizontal solidarity among the very poorest can hardly be called fair or just, and it certainly does not promote equality within the community: it is actually tantamount to the distribution of poverty among the poor, not its resolution.
Second, it has long been the case that far too many microfinance institutions get away with claiming that high interest rates are necessary to keep their operation in surplus, when in fact the high interest rates are actually all about underpinning the high salaries and bonuses the senior managers deem they simply must receive be paid. Perhaps the most spectacular case of this what can only be called a scam, is that of Banco Compartamos in Mexico. This institution currently charges around 80% on its microloans (or nearly 129% according to the calculations made by Chuck Waterfield of Microfinance Transparency – see The Challenge of Understanding Pricing of Micro-loans, 15 May 2010). Digging deeper it was found out that over the 1990s the senior managers were quietly paying themselves Wall Street-style salaries and bonuses, plus from 2004 onwards raking off large dividends on their shareholdings too. Then they went for the ‘big one’ – an IPO – which brought absolutely nothing whatsoever for its poor female clients, but, as presumably intended, huge financial windfalls for the senior managers. This tells us everything we need to know about the future of commercialised microfinance and what it is all about. Unfortunately, the Banco Compartamos example now looks like being topped in terms of its sheer greed and naked self-interest by the example of SKS, the largest microfinance institution in India. SKS is also now going through an IPO process, one that has already rewarded the founder, ex-McKinsey consultant Mr Vikram Akula, with more than $12million for 25% of the shares he generously allotted to himself, and a likely further $50 million for the remaining 75%. It is hugely insulting to the poor to claim that these dynamics are ‘all about helping the poor’, and that managers like Mr Akula are getting stratospherically rich purely coincidentally or by accident almost. In fact, this new dynamic represent a new form of what might be called ‘compassionate exploitation’, a process favoured by up-and-coming elites – or ‘accumulation by dispossession’ as social theorist David Harvey has notably called the process.
Another wider and longer-term problem with microfinance that the article should really have flagged up much more than it did, especially since this is a key concern of UNIDO and some other UN agencies (UNCTAD in particular), is that microfinance clearly helps facilitate the further deindustrialisation and infantilisation of the typical local economy in developing and transition countries. This occurs precisely because microfinance institutions overwhelmingly support only the very tiniest and very simplest of microenterprises – that is, street vending, cross-border shuttle trading, petty services, and some simple production-based activities that add value very quickly. So, to the extent that local savings and remittance income are increasingly channelled into such simple activities via the rapid growth of microfinance institutions, and so channelled away from more sophisticated and scaled-up activities associated with small and medium enterprises, the more the economic structure of that country, region or locality is inevitably going to be undermined and destroyed. This is in fact an ‘Iron Law of Microfinance’, a Law that many international development agencies are now, finally, coming around to accepting exists. For example, just look at the IADB’s flagship publication for 2010, ‘The Age of Productivity, a report that centrally highlights the enormous economic and social damage has been done right across Latin America thanks to the programmed channelling of financial support towards the most unproductive microenterprises and the self-employed. Mexico and Bolivia are given specific mention in this context, both of which, of course, are countries universally noted for being ‘saturated’ with microfinance. Latin America’s poverty and under-development is directly traceable to this adverse financial sector dynamic, the IADB says, and not to a shortfall of foreign investment, privatisation or liberalisation as was hitherto flagged up by the World Bank, IMF and US government.
One other aspect of microfinance beloved of its supporters and touched upon in this article is the empowerment of women angle. The author of this article goes along with this understanding. But this angle is far more bluff than reality. Most independent researchers report the reverse: women are actually disempowered as they get sucked more and more into the (under)world of microfinance and microdebt peonage. In fact, what microfinance advocates are aiming at is actually to get poor women to accept that the market is the sole avenue for improving their position; just forget the state, trade unions, collective organisations, pressure groups and so on coming to your assistance like in the past. Today, as intended, a women in poverty is increasingly permitted only one avenue to escape poverty – try to make a go of a microenterprise. In other words, and this is hugely important in helping explain microfinance, it is markets that are being empowered here, not women.
Finally, I disagree with one other aspect of the article regarding the benefits of microfinance. Even where positive improvements are said to exist thanks to microfinance, such as in terms of consumption smoothing, the article should really have pointed out that almost ANY intervention will produce some positive aspects to it. So we can’t use this simple fact to justify microfinance, especially if we don’t point out the downsides too. There is no doubt, for example, that central planning had many positive sides to it for very many poor people, especially in the remote Eastern regions that were all but ignored for many years. But it was nevertheless very widely accepted – both in the former Soviet Union and in the western countries – that central planning was hugely inefficient as a whole, and so needed replacing with a much more dynamic economic structure with more entrepreneurship and private activity. The important point is the cost and benefits, not whether you can detect a small benefit from microfinance. And remember, above all, that a microdebt must still be repaid: it is not a grant. So consumption today must still be matched by decreased consumption or investment later. There is also the high interest rate aspect to take on board: with high interest rates, the poor end up repaying a lot of their meagre incomes out as interest payments on their growing bundles of microloans. This is for sure not the way to poverty reduction, but to microdebt peonage. Unfortunately, shifting the goalposts like this is becoming increasingly common – financial inclusion is the new goal of microfinance, not poverty reduction – but this ‘goal rotation’ should not be accepted by those concerned with wanting to find real solutions to poverty, rather than imagined ones.
In the light of no real economic or social justification for microfinance, it is good to see, finally, that this article correctly flags up that there is a political/ideological justification for microfinance. It cannot be stressed too much how the political and ideological imperatives of the neoliberal-oriented development institutions, principally USAID, the World Bank and the IMF, have stood four-square behind the global push for microfinance. Now that, in the wake of the collapse of Lehmann Brothers in late 2008, neoliberal policies are effectively dead, we await to see if the political/ideological impetus to continue with microfinance will also die. So far, there is considerable evidence to show that as more of the problems precipitated by microfinance are exposed, microfinance as an anti- poverty tool is rapidly declining in value within the eyes of the main international development agencies (e.g., in the IADB). But whether microfinance goes very soon to the graveyard of failed neoliberal policies, or remains in operation zombie-like for a few more years, still remains to be seen.
Milford Bateman
Author of ‘Why Doesn’t Microfinance Work? The Destructive Rise of Local Neoliberalism’
I take most of the comments on my article as complementary. Some of the concerns raised in the comments are in fact mentioned in the longer version of the article, published as a DESA working paper (no. 89). Where we differ is on some likely positive impacts. While Bateman is totally dismissive, I am willing to accept that there might be some positives, and one of them is learning by doing.
I have no disagreement about problems of counter-factuals and randomised control trials. However, despite limitations, as most other methodologies, most of the studies using the technique came out with sceptical conclusions. I agree with the possibility of a debt trap, i.e. micro borrowers paying one loan with another – it’s like having multiple credit cards.
Second, the concern about job displacement and client failure is also quite valid and I also raised this, especially in the context of a stagnant or slow growing economy. I did emphasise that overall macroeconomic condition must be robust for microenterprises to succeed. Otherwise, there is a real possibility of falling into a debt trap.
The comment on interest rates and full cost recovery is quite extended. The longer version of my paper relates to exploitation of labour surplus. Obviously, the surplus is captured by the CEOs and other employees in the form of high salaries and other benefits. The examples cited in the commentary strengthens my argument.
The issue of de-industrialisation is interesting, and was not captured fully in my article. However, the discussion on the problems of microenterprises and on the importance of developmental-oriented macro and industrial policies does cover the issue to some extent.
I agree that micro credit is an inefficient way of providing social security. In the absence of a comprehensive universal social security system, micro credit is a second best solution for consumption smoothing, and it has some beneficial effects if consumption smoothing means keeping the children at school or seeking medical help at time of economic distress.
I cannot claim to have any expertise in the matter of micro-finance apart from receiving pocket money (grants, not loans) from my dad many decades ago. But the discussion above did make me think a bit. To me, the key elements of the discussion were:
- Micro credit can help to create a better social environment for development, though it may result in the same debt trap as informal lending
- It is of doubtful value in making the leap from self-supporting to (technologically) innovative, dynamic enterprise
- To make the best of it, you need an overall social and political environment that is conducive to broad-based development
- Micro-credit bankers are not necessarily morally superior to other bankers
The latter would bring me to the need to give policy its rightful place again; the free-for-all ideology of the past decades has predictably done a lot of socio-economic and environmental damage. But here I’d like to concentrate on # 3, which I think is a key point. The savings and “farmers loan” banks that emerged in Western Europe in the 19th century catered for people whose position in society was often not much better than that of the poor in many developing countries. These banks came to play a very important role in the economy, and for the less well-off in particular. As most countries were properly governed and the feudal system had received a death blow, some major barriers to participation in development for those at the lower end of society had disappeared (even though it would be some time before everyone accepted that farmers’ and workers’ associations were not a threat to society). Quite rightly, UN projects now insist that the social and gender aspects of development are taken seriously – but it’ll be some time before everyone understands that…A very difficult issue that very often remains, however, is good governance, which must ensure that those who have been given a ‘leg up’ by a development project will find no other obstacles to their progress in society.
On a related issue, I would suggest a look at the (admittedly partisan) post by Milford Bateman on ODI’s blog (http://blogs.odi.org.uk/blogs/main/archive/2010/08/17/microfinance_SKS.aspx) entitled “Commercialised microfinance: a Wall Street-style calamity for the poor?”
It reminded me of earlier work I did on the link between SME cluster development and micro-finance where I first stumbled across the notion of micro-debit as the “dark side” of microfinance: is it so absurd to imagine future debates on micro-subprimes? Admittedly the interest rates charged are likely to offer more room for security. Having worked in close proximity to several MFI in Asia, I often wondered how safe their entire portfolio could be, in view of very aggressive marketing , especially in rural villages where the scope for productive investment was fairly low
Poverty ends thanks to education. Dollars don’t reduce poverty.
It’s great to see the discussion here. My input is straightforward: I’ve seen microfinance first-hand in Mexico, Ecuador, Chile, and Bolivia and I have observed the savings as microfinance itself was a ‘counterfactual’ to the status-quo higher-interest moneylenders. Should the poor have some level access to credit as the middle-class and affluent do? Of course! This access allows people to achieve more than they could with their own resources: credit is a social service. And just as the middle-class and affluent should not be burdened by debts/mortgage foreclosures/credit card traps, the poor also should not be burdened by microdebt. Access to financial services (for the affluent and the poor) must be paired with financial responsibility and fair/ethical lending practices.
good post, added you to my RSS reader. Greetings from DC
I actually came here because this web-site has been tweeted by a person I was following and i am very glad I made it here.
Read Milford Bateman on the Andhra Pradesh microfinance crisis
Does Microfinance Reduce Poverty? An Analysis of India’s Crisis
Arvind Panagariya, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development, The Brookings Institution
Article about the microfinance organization, Fonkoze, and its work in Haiti since the earthquake.
Nice post, thanks. I signed up to RSS on this blog.
I sort of found this blog by mistake, but it caught my attention and I thought that I would post to let you know that I really like it. I enjoyed this post and will be telling my friends about this site.
You have some helpful ideas!
I really appreciate articles on your site. You’re doing a fine job! Thanks a lot.